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Abstract  
We show that even under incomplete markets, the equilibrium manifold identifies 
aggregate demand and individual demands everywhere in their domains. 
Moreover, under partial observation of the equilibrium manifold, we we construct 
maximal domains of identification. For this, we assume conditions of smoothness, 
interiority and regularity, but avoid implausible observational requirements. It is 
crucial that there be date-zero consumption. As a by-product, we develop some 
duality theory under incomplete markets. 
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Mostramos como, aún en mercados incompletes, la variedad de equilibrio 
identifica la demanda agregada y las demandas individuales en todas partes de su 
dominio. Más aún, bajo observación parcial de la variedad de equilibrio, 
construimos dominios máximos de identificación. Utilizamos condiciones de 
suavidad y regularidad pero evitamos hacer hipótesis poco plausibles sobre los 
observables de la economía. Es crucial la existencia de consumo en el primer 
período. Como un subproducto desarrollamos la teoría dual básica de la teoría del 
consumidor en mercados incompletos. 
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  2When there exist uninsurable risks, competitive equilibrium is typically ineﬃcient in a strong
sense: a planner could use the existing insurance possibilities to make every individual better oﬀ
(Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [10]). The question immediately arises of how much information
a planner needs to have in order to ﬁgure out an improving policy intervention. The question
is not trivial: the transfer paradox, ﬁrst pointed out by Leontief, and generalized by Donsimoni
and Polemarchakis [8], illustrates how ambiguous the welfare eﬀects of a policy can be when the
fundamentals of the economy are unknown.
Under the hypothesis of general equilibrium, the aggregate demand function cannot be assumed
to be observed: at equilibrium prices aggregate demand is, by deﬁnition, equal to aggregate endow-
ment. Demand, either individual or aggregate, cannot be observed for out-of-equilibrium prices.
One can observe, however, equilibrium prices and individual incomes. In this paper we address the
problem of identifying individual preferences from the equilibrium manifold of a dynamic economy
with ﬁnancial markets.
For the standard Arrow-Debreu model, positive results have been obtained by Balasko [1], Chi-
appori et al. [6] and [7], Matzkin [17] and Carvajal and Riascos [5]. Balasko’s result has been
criticized for making very strong observational assumptions: that one can observe equilibrium prices
in situations in which endowment is zero for all individuals but one. Under regularity assumptions,
Chiappori et al obtain local identiﬁcation of individual demands, but their argument has been crit-
icized by Balasko, who has pointed out that it requires extreme smoothness assumptions. Matzkin
determines the largest class of fundamentals for which identiﬁcation is possible, by excluding trans-
lations of the income expansion paths of individual demands. Carvajal and Riascos obtain local
(maximal) and global identiﬁcation of individual demands, by combining the methods of Balasko
and Chiappori et al. in a way that avoids their weaknesses: it does not use boundary information,
nor does it require analyticity of preferences.
The case of uncertainty is more cumbersome. Kubler et al. [13] extend the results of Chiappori
et al.[6]: they use the implicit function theorem to identify individual demands (locally) from the
equilibrium correspondence, and then use Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [11] to identify preferences
from individual demand functions.
This paper extends the results of Carvajal and Riascos [5] -and hence of Balasko and Chiappori et
al.- to the case of uncertainty. We assume an economy with numeraire assets and show that we can
identify individual demands locally (moreover, we ﬁnd maximal domains in which local identiﬁcation
holds). As a corollary, it follows that identiﬁcation holds globally, if there is global equilibrium
information. For general real assets structures, we conjecture that our results hold generically in
4the space of prices and endowments. We extend Balasko’s idea on how to recover the aggregate
demand function from the equilibrium manifold to the case of (possibly incomplete) asset markets,
hence we avoid using the implicit function theorem. We then use a slightly diﬀerent argument from
Kubler et al.’s to identify individual demands from the aggregate demand function and we also avoid
using Balasko’s strong observational assumption. In contrast to Kubler et al., our results do not
assume that preferences are additively separable across states. If that assumption is made, however,
our result suﬃces to imply, by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [11], that the equilibrium manifold
locally identiﬁes individual preferences. As a necessary by-product, we develop some basic duality
theory for incomplete markets.
1 No-arbitrage equilibrium
Consider the canonical, two-period, incomplete markets model with ﬁnancial assets. There are S+1
states of nature, s =0 ,...,S,1 I individuals, i =1 ,...,I,a n dL > 2 commodities available in each
state, l =1 ,...,L.D e n o t eL(S +1 )by N and deﬁne the commodity space as RN
+.
A ﬁnancial asset is a contract v ∈ RS that promises delivery of an amount vs ∈ R of commodity
l =1at state of nature s =1 ,...,S.L e tp =( ps)
S
s=0 ∈ RN
++ denote the vector of commodity prices,
where ps =( ps,l)L
l=1 ∈ RL
++ and ps,l denotes the price in state s of one unit of good l. Date-1 prices
are denoted by p1 =( ps)
S
s=1.
Let v1,...,vJ be J ≥ 1 ﬁnancial assets, deﬁne V (p1) as the matrix of income transfers:
V (p1)=
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
p1,1 0 ··· 0














































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
The space of income transfers is the column span of the matrix of income transfers: hV (p1)i =
©
t ∈ RS¯ ¯¡
∃z ∈ RJ¢
: V (p1)z = t
ª
. In general, as p1 changes, hV (p1)i changes. By construction,
however, for p1 ∈ RLS
++, the dimension of hV (p1)i is always equal to the rank of V .
1State s =0is used to denote date zero.
5Assume the following:
Condition 1 V has full column rank.




++ represent an endowment of commodities.








ps · (xs − ws) ≤ 0 and p1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (p1)i
)
,
where x1 =( xs)
S
s=1 and w1 =( ws)
S
s=1. Future consumption x1 is ﬁnancially feasible at future prices
and endowments (p1,w 1) if the second condition in the deﬁnition of B(p,w) is satisﬁed: there is a
portfolio of assets, z ∈ RJ, that delivers the transfers necessary to ﬁnance x1.3







a set that we denote by S
N−1
++ .
Assume that there are I ∈ N individuals. Individual i ∈ I = {1,...,I} has preferences ui :
RN
+ −→ R, which are assumed to satisfy the following condition:














++,b yfi(p,w) = argmaxx∈B(p,w) ui(x),













i∈I and F are well deﬁned, since for (p,w) ∈ S
N−1
++ × RN
++, B(p,w) is nonempty,
compact and convex, and each ui is continuous and strongly quasi-concave. Condition 2 guarantees
that the range of fi is contained in RN
++.

















2For any (ρ,γ) ∈ RLS × RLS,w ed e n o t eρ ¡ ∆ =

ρ1 · ∆1 ··· ρS · ∆S
>.
3If dimhV (P1)i = S,o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,dimhV i = S, the second condition that deﬁnes B(P,w;V ) is nonbinding.
T h i si st h ec a s eo fc o m p l e t em a r k e t s .
4This condition excludes additively separable preferences of the form ui (x)=
SS
s=0 ui






s=0. In this case, our analysis still holds if we introduce the following assumption: for every se-
quence (xn)∞
n=1 in RL
++,i fi tc o n v e r g e st os o m ex in ∂RL




s (xn)·xn −→ 0 and
 Dui
s (xn)
 −1 −→ ∞.
6Notice that, since V has full column rank, in the previous deﬁnition we need not explicitly





















Since F is continuous, it is straightforward that M is closed.
Henceforth, we maintain the assumption that there are an asset structure that satisﬁes condition 1
and a proﬁle of preferences that satisﬁes condition 2, and assume that some subset of the equilibrium
manifold is observed.5 We study whether unobserved preferences can be uniquely determined from
that subset, but we do not test their existence. Thus, our question is one of identiﬁcation and not one
of testability or refutability, which has been dealt with elsewhere.6 Since, under our assumptions,
equilibrium is known to exist for every proﬁle of preferences and endowments, our observational
assumption is not vacuous.
2 From the Equilibrium Manifold to Aggregate Demand
















∈ hV (p1)i and satisﬁes that
¡








i∈I =⇒ F(p,w)=F(p, b w).




++ and D ⊆ S
N−1
++ ×RNI
++,d e n o t eb yΦ|D the restriction of Φ to
D.
We say that E ⊆ M identiﬁes F over D ⊆ S
N−1
++ × RNI
















and is such that
¡








i∈I =⇒ Φ(p,w)=Φ(p, b w)
5So far, we have deﬁned the manifold in terms of present-value prices of commodities only. Section 4 shows how
to identify subsets of the manifold so deﬁned, from observation of the manifold deﬁned in terms of spot commodity
prices and asset prices.
6For the standard Arrow-Debreu model, see Brown and Matzkin [3]. For the case of uncertainty, see Kubler [12].












it is true that Φ|D = F|D.
If in the previous deﬁnition we drop the requirement that Φ be continuous, then we say that E
strongly identiﬁes F over D. Clearly, strong identiﬁcation implies identiﬁcation.
Intuitively, we say that E identiﬁes F over D if, for any function that cannot be ruled out as
aggregate demand function, we have that, on the restricted domain D, that function is identical to
the true aggregate demand function. A function cannot be ruled out as aggregate demand function
w h e n( i )i ts a t i s ﬁes the properties that are necessary for it to be an aggregate demand, and (ii) it is
consistent with the observed data (because all the observed equilibria are equilibrium according to
it).
We say that the equilibrium manifold identiﬁes (strongly identiﬁes) aggregate demand
globally if M identiﬁes (strongly identiﬁes) F over S
N−1
++ × RNI
++. It is straightforward that the
equilibrium manifold identiﬁes aggregate demand globally if, and only if, F is the only continuous















hV (p1)i and Φ is such that
¡




















In the case of global identiﬁcation, every function that satisﬁes the properties of an aggregate
demand can be ruled out, with the only exception of the true aggregate demand.
Some properties of the concept of identiﬁcation, that straightforwardly apply here, are shown
by Carvajal and Riascos [5]. For example, (i) identiﬁcation over a set implies identiﬁcation over
its subsets; (ii) identiﬁcation from a subset of the manifold suﬃces to imply identiﬁcation from its
supersets (over the same, given, set); (iii) identiﬁcation over a set implies identiﬁcation over its
closure.
8For any E ⊆ M,d e ﬁne
DE =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨











⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
(p, b w) ∈ E
¡
















⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
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.
The key result is the following theorem, which generalizes the idea of Balasko to less-than-global
observation under uncertainty.
Theorem 1 E ⊆ M identiﬁes F over any D ⊆ DE,s t r o n g l yo v e ra n yD ⊆ DE.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that E strongly identiﬁes F over DE.












.F i x (p,w) ∈ DE.B y d e ﬁnition, we can ﬁx b w ∈ RNI
++ such






∈ hV (p1)i for all i. Then, by construction,
Φ(p,w)=Φ(p, b w) and F(p, b w)=F(p,w).S i n c e E ⊆
©
(e p, e w)|Φ(e p, e w)=
P
i∈I e wiª
, it follows that
Φ(p, b w)=
P
i∈I b wi,w h e r e a ss i n c eE ⊆ M, F(p, b w)=
P
i∈I b wi. It follows that Φ(p,w)=F(p,w).
Corollary 1 The equilibrium manifold strongly identiﬁes aggregate demand globally.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that DM = S
N−1
++ ×RNI
++.L e tb wi = fi(p,wi) ∈ RN
++. By monotonicity,













∈ M is straightforward, since fi(p, b wi)= b wi.
Lemma 1 If E ⊆ M is closed and the closure of E in S
N−1
++ × RNI




then DE is closed.
Proof. Let (pn,w n)
∞
n=1 be a sequence deﬁned in DE such that (pn,w n)
∞




++.B yd e ﬁnition, there exists (b wn)
∞
n=1 such that (pn, b wn)
∞
n=1 is a sequence in E such that, for all
n ∈ N,
³¡






















n=1 is bounded and (pn)
∞
n=1 is bounded away from 0, it follows that (b wn)
∞
n=1
is bounded: for every (i,n,s,l) ∈ I×N ×{ 0,...,S}×{ 1,...,L},



















(p, b w). Since the closure of E in S
N−1
++ × RNI
+ is contained in S
N−1
++ × RNI




++,a n d ,s i n c eE is closed (in S
N−1
++ × RNI

















→ (p, b w) and wn −→ w,t h e n
V (pn(k)),1) → V (p1) and, therefore, since V has full column rank, zn(k) → z for some z in RJI.






= V (p1)zi,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,
(p,w) ∈ DE.
As in Carvajal and Riascos [5], if the manifold is known only up to a lower bound on the value
of wealth, then aggregate demand is identiﬁed subject to the same restriction. The largest domain
on which, given E ⊆ M,i d e n t i ﬁcation is possible, is determined next.7
Theorem 2 1. Suppose E ⊆ M is closed and the closure of E in S
N−1
++ × RNI




++. If E identiﬁes F over D,t h e nD ⊆ DE.
2. If E ⊆ M strongly identiﬁes F over D,t h e nD ⊆ DE.




the function distance-to-E,w h i c h ,s i n c eE is closed, is deﬁned by
δ (p,w)= m i n
(  p,  w)∈E
k(p,w) − (e p, e w)k









ps · (xs − ws)=0and p1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (p1)i
)
and deﬁne the function ∆ : S
N−1
++ × RNI







δ (p, e w),1
)
,
which is well deﬁned (because δ is continuous and each B
¡
p,wi¢
is compact) and is continuous.
Moreover, suppose that ∆(p,w)=0 ;t h i si m p l i e st h a tmin  w∈
 
i∈I B(p,wi) δ (p, e w)=0and hence,










, δ (p, e w)=0 ; it follows





, it follows that (p,w) ∈ DE; then, it is
7The following theorem is stronger and its proof considerably simpliﬁes the one reported in [5] for complete markets.
10immediate that ∆(p,w)=0⇐⇒ (p,w) ∈ DE. Also, by construction,
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=⇒ ∆(p, b w)=∆(p,w)













Function Φ is well deﬁned: it is continuous, maps into RN








∈ hV (p1)i and
¡¡












i∈I =⇒ Φ(p, b w)=Φ(p,w)








Now, assume that D * DE and let (p,w) ∈ D\DE.B yi d e n t i ﬁcation over D, Φ(p,w)=F (p,w),
so ∆(p,w)=0and, hence, (p,w) ∈ DE, an obvious contradiction.

















, if (p,w) / ∈ DE
.





























⊇ E, because DE ∩ M ⊇ E. Now suppose that there is (p,w) ∈
D\DE. Then, by deﬁnition, b Φ0,2 (p,w)=
F0,2(p,w)
2 , and, since (p,w) ∈ D and E identiﬁes F over D
then Φ(p,w)=F (p,w), implying that F0,2 (p,w)=0 , which is impossible.
113 From Aggregate Demand to Individual Demands
If equilibrium prices are observable for situations in which the incomes of all individuals but one
are zero, the argument above still holds and, then, it is straightforward that aggregate demand
identiﬁes individual demands. That result, however, is not surprising: observation of situations in
which the endowments of all consumers but one are pegged at zero amounts, in eﬀect, to assuming
that individual information is available.
We now show that, under an additional assumption, one can identify individual demands, without
resorting to boundary analysis. Our proof is somewhat similar to the one presented by Kubler et
al., but simpler: it does not require separability of preferences; it does not require us to claim
uniqueness of the solution to a system of partial diﬀerential equations; and it requires a weaker
regularity condition than the one used by Kubler et al.
For the sake of simplicity in the presentation, we initially study the global setting introduced in
the previous section. The case in which the aggregate demand is not globally known is presented
afterwards.
3.1 The global case:
In this case, we weaken Kubler et al.’s Regularity assumption as follows:





is diﬀerentiably strictly monotone and diﬀerentiably strongly concave, and for every p ∈ S
N−1
++ ,t h e r e
exist w ∈ RN



























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
6=0 .
The previous condition is weaker because w only needs an existential, and not a universal, quan-
tiﬁer, because it is not assumed state-by-state and because it is not assumed for asset demands.
The condition is indeed restrictive as it requires, for example, that income eﬀects do not vanish.
Intuitively, the condition requires that preferences be “complex enough” so as to generate the inde-
pendence of income eﬀects. As Chiappori et al. have pointed out, under complete markets it suﬃces
that individual demands have rank at least two for the condition to be met everywhere. Appendix
1 illustrates the assumption.

































Proof. That fi ∈ C3 follows from Duﬃe and Shafer [9]. Symmetry follows from theorems 4 and
6 in appendix 2.

















ras’s law and Slutsky symmetry, and such that
P
i∈I ϕi = F.




i∈I satisfy Walras’s law and Slutsky symmetry and be such that F =
P
i∈I ϕi.





++ and γi : S
N−1
++ −→ RN by θ
i (p,w)=F (p,(1,1,...,w,...,1)),
where w occupies the ith position, and γi (p)=−
P
j∈I\{i} ϕj (p,1).













































































Fix p ∈ S
N−1



























































































































































































































































































i, which is determined by F.
By regularity, for some wi ∈ RN





















































































+ γi (p) and the expression on the right hand side of equation (*)
depends only on F, it follows that ϕi
s,l = fi
s,l, which implies that ϕi = fi.
143.2 Restricted observation




j∈I\{i} in the proof of theorem 4 is arbitrary and that when only
F|D is available, such choice can be modiﬁed as needed. If only local information of F is available,
one must strengthen the second part of the assumption so that, for given prices, the proﬁle of
endowments at which the condition is met lies in the observed domain. For the sake of simplicity,
assume that we strengthen condition 3 by substituting the existential quantiﬁer of w by the universal
quantiﬁer.
Let D ⊆ S
N−1
++ ×RNI
++ and, for every i,l e tDi ⊆ S
N−1
++ ×RN




















law and Slutsky symmetry, and such that:
¡





















|D = F (p,w)|D



















i∈I if, for any proﬁle of functions that
cannot be ruled out as individual demands, we have that, on the restricted domains
¡
Di¢
i∈I,t h o s e
functions are identical to the true demand functions. A proﬁle of functions cannot be ruled out as
individual demands when (i) it satisﬁes the properties that are necessary for a proﬁle of individual
demands, and (ii) it is (locally) consistent with aggregate demand.
Theorem 5 Let D ⊆ S
N−1
++ × RNI
++ and, for each i ∈ I,d e n o t e
Di =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨







¯ ¯(∃(b p, b w) ∈ D0):
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
b p = p
¡
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⎠
⎫
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
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i∈I, satisfy Walras’s law, Sluts k ys y m m e t r ya n ds u c ht h a t
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|D = F (p,w)|D




0,w h e r eDi














∈ D0.S i n c e D0 is open, there exists
 >0 such that
©









e p ∈ S
L−1
++











e p, e wi¢
−
¡
p,wi¢° ° < 
ª
,
and deﬁne the functions θ
i : Oi −→ RL
+ and γi : O −→ RL
+,a sθ
i ¡





w1,w 2,..., e wi,...,wI¢¢
,




. By Slutsky symmetry and

























. Then, for each n ∈ N,t h e r ee x i s t se wn ∈ RNI














































































4 Observability: Financial Markets Equilibrium Manifold
Identiﬁcation results are useful when based on observable data. In real life one does not observe
date-zero present-value equilibrium prices, but, instead, one observes (ﬁnancial) equilibrium spot
prices for commodities and asset prices.
4.1 From the Equilibrium Manifold to Aggregate Demand
Let q ∈ RJ be the price vector at which assets can be bought at s =0 .
For (p,q) ∈ RN














p0 · (x0 − w0) ≤− qz



















Asset prices q ∈ RJ are a no-arbitrage price vector if Vz>0 implies that q · z>0.I t i s w e l l
known that no-arbitrage is a necessary condition for optimization, and that q is a no-arbitrage price
only if for some π ∈ RS
++, q = πV.L e tQ denote the set (positive cone) of no-arbitrage price vectors.









as fi(p,q,w) = argmaxx∈B(p,q,w) u(x), which is well deﬁned since B(p,q,w) is nonempty, compact
(because q is a no-arbitrage price vector) and convex, and u is continuous and strongly quasi-concave.

















is (x,z,p,q) ∈ RNI







1. For every i, xi = fi(p,q,wi), p0 · (xi
0 − wi













Since V has full column rank,
P
























Under our assumptions, F is continuous and satisﬁes:






































=⇒ F(p,q,w)=F(p,q, b w)















++,d e n o t eb yΦ|D
the restriction of Φ to D.







































































it is true that Φ|D = F|D.
If in the previous deﬁnition we drop the requirement that Φ be continuous, then we say that E
strongly identiﬁes F over D. Clearly, strong identiﬁcation implies identiﬁcation.
Since, what may be observed in the real world is subsets of M, we now show how to derive subsets
E of M from subsets E of M and functions Φ on S
N−1
++ × RNI

























































Theorem 6 Let E ⊆ M.
1. E ⊆ M.








++ satisﬁes the properties that characterize identiﬁcation
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.
Then, E identiﬁes F over DE,s t r o n g l yo v e rDE.
Proof. It is well known that if p ∈ RN
++ and π =( π0,π1) ∈ {1}×RS







. By substitution, then, for every p ∈ S
N−1





















































++ satisﬁes properties (1) and (2) in the
deﬁnition of identiﬁcation in ﬁnancial markets (clearly, if Φ is continuous, then Φ is cotinuous).
We now check that Φ satisﬁes all the properties that characterize identiﬁcation in the no-arbitrage
equilibrium manifold.







































































































=( V (p1) − q)z.
Let q =
PS



































































































































++ such that it satisﬁes the properties that characterize strong identiﬁcation and
(p,q,w) ∈ DE.B yd e ﬁnition, there exists (b w,z) ∈ RNI













= Vz i, for all i. By no-arbitrage, for some π ∈ {1}×RS















s=0 , b w
´
∈ E ⊆ M.B yp a r t s(1)
and (2) of this theorem, Φ satisﬁes all the properties that characterize strong identiﬁcation in the










s=0 , b w
´




s=0 , b w
´




s=0 , b w
´
and hence Φ(p,q,w)=F(p,q,w).
The following corollary stablishes the global result.
Corollary 2 Global knowledge of the ﬁnancial markets manifold identiﬁes aggregate demand glob-
ally.






















i∈I then obviously, there exists z ∈ RJI such that (b w,z) ∈ RNI
++×















i∈I. Therefore (p,q,w) ∈ DE.
For completness we include the following theorem. Knowledge of the ﬁnancial markets manifold























Then M = M.










































where the third equality follows from the fact pointed out at the beginning of the previous proof.






i∈I a n da na s s e ts t r u c t u r eV ,
if M(ui)i∈I = M(  ui)i∈I,t h e nM(ui)i∈I = M(  ui)i∈I, which is to say that the equilibrium manifold is
identiﬁed.
We know identify the largest domain on which, given E ⊆ M, identiﬁcation is possible.















1. E ⊆ M is closed and the closure of E in S
N−1
++ × RNI




2. DE is closed.
Proof. This is straightforward.
We are now ready for the main theorem regarding the identiﬁcation of the aggregate demand
from the ﬁnancial markets equilibrium manifold. For this, we will need to strenghten condition (2).




, monotone, strongly quasi-concave, diﬀerentiable strictly
monotone (i.e., ∀x ∈ RN
++,D u i (x) >> 0) and diferenciable strictly concave (∀x ∈ RN
++,D 2ui (x)
























++. If E identiﬁes F over D,t h e nD ⊆ DE.
2. If E ⊆ M strongly identiﬁes F over D,t h e nD ⊆ DE.
Proof. For the ﬁrst part, suppose it’s not true. Let (p,q,w) / ∈ DE. Deﬁne
¡
b wi = fi(p,q,wi)
¢
i∈I ,


























s=0 , b w
´




s=0 , b w
´
/ ∈ DE. By lemma (***) we can deﬁne







































s=0 , b w)) ∈ DE.


















22Then Φ satisﬁes all properties that characterize identiﬁcation in the ﬁnancial markets manifold

























































i∈I wi ⇒ Φ(p,q,w)=
P
i∈I wi.
Finally, by hyphotesis E ⊆ M strongly identiﬁes F over D therefore, Φ(p,q,w)=F(p,q,w) but





s=0 , b w
´
















s=0 , b w
´
a contradiction.
For the second part the argument is similar.
Remark 1 Strictly speaking, part (2) does not require strenghtening condicion (2) on utility fucn-
tions.
4.2 From Aggregate Demand to Individual Demands
In this section we brieﬂy discuss, for simplicity, the case of global identiﬁcation.



















i∈I ϕi = F.and






















Walras’s law and Slutsky symmetry.
Theorem 9 Aggregate demand identiﬁes individual demands globally.













that satisfy all conditions that characterize individual identiﬁcation from the aggregate demand







++ such that ϕj (p,q,w) 6= fj (p,q,w). Let π =( π0,π1) ∈ {1}×RS
++ be such























is the same as the individual demands introduced in the ﬁrst














5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have shown that enough information on how prices respond to income shocks can pin down, in
a unique manner, unobserved individual information.
When there is global information about the equilibria, given unobserved preferences and observed
asset structure, one can identify the aggregate demand function. This is a remarkable property of the
competitive model: the roots of a function (the aggregate excess demand) contain as much informa-
tion as the whole function itself. Less than global knowledge will, obviously, give less comprehensive
information about the aggregate demand. These results obtain as a consequence of simple prop-
erties of the model, namely (i) Walras’s law, (ii) the fact that, for each individual, if two possible
endowments have the same market value and give the same ﬁnancial constraint, then they give the
same demand, and (iii) no-trade equilibria immediately inform about the aggregate demand.
Then we show that aggregate demand can be used to recover, uniquely, individual demands. This
requires that income eﬀects be diﬀerent across commodities, which in turn requires that observed
domains allow for perturbations of all possible endowments, which is indeed a restrictive assumption
(in particular, as it requires that some income eﬀects do not vanish). Again, local information gives
local identiﬁcation, while the same is true for global information.
The results do not require that preferences be separable across states, but, if one is willing to
assume that they are, then they have the implication that equilibrium prices contain the same infor-
mation as the proﬁle of individual preferences (by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [11]). Namely,
when going from preferences to equilibrium prices, we ﬁrst optimize, then aggregate and then solve
for market clearing; the results imply that after all this transformations we still have essentially the
same information as at the beginning, which contrasts with the anything-goes intuition that was
derived from the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu literature.
From a more practical perspective, one would hope that these results implied that readily avail-
able market information suﬃces for the unambiguous determination of the welfare eﬀects of economic
policy, something that is desirable (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [10]) but far from obvious (Don-
simoni and Polemarchakis [8]). But, for this to be true, identiﬁcation results based on more realistic
24data are necessary. On the one hand, identiﬁcation of Pareto improving policies has been shown to
fail when price eﬀects across commodities are unknown (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [11]) and
when only a ﬁnite data set is available for a nonstationary economy (work in progress by A. Carvajal
and H.M. Polemarchakis). Moreover, identiﬁcation, or lack thereof, in the presence of production,
or for stationary economies, remains an open problem.
256 Appendix 1: Regularity
It follows from Lewbel [14] and Blanks, Blundell Lewbel [2] that there exists u0 : R3
+ −→ R such
that f : R3
++ × R++ −→ R3
















are the solutions to the problem
max
x u0 (x) s.t. p · x = m,
where Al,B l and Cl are homogeneous of degree zero in p and a is homogeneous of degree 1 in p




















for all p and m (which is necessary for Walras’s law).8
Now, suppose that there are three commodities and two states of nature so that, for some
functions u1 and u2, u(x0,x 1,x 2)=u0 (x0)+m i n{u1 (x1),u 2 (x2)}.
Suppose that there is only one asset, V =[ 1 − 1]
> and deﬁne
vs (p,m)=m a x





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




p1 · (x1 − w1)
p2 · (x2 − w2)
⎤
⎥
⎦ ∈ hV (p1)i
.
By construction,
v(p,w)= m a x
m0,m1,m2
(v0 (p0,m 0)+m i n{v1 (p1,m 1),v 2 (p2,m 2)})
st.
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




m1 − p1 · w1
m2 − p2 · w2
⎤
⎥
⎦ ∈ hV (p1)i
8For example, take: Ai(P)=1 /3, Bl(P)=bl, Cl(P)=ciP1 kPk−1,w i t hb1 + b2 + b3 =0and c1 + c2 + c3 =0 .
26Claim 1 Let m0 (p,w), m1 (p,w) and m2 (p,w) denote the solution of
max
m0,m1,m2
(v0 (p0,m 0)+m i n{v1 (p1,m 1),v 2 (p2,m 2)})
st.
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




m1 − p1 · w1
m2 − p2 · w2
⎤
⎥
⎦ ∈ hV (p1)i
and let (p, e w) be such that v1 (p1,m 1 (p, e w)) = v2 (p2,m 2 (p, e w)). Then, for every w0 > e w0,
∂m0
∂w0,1
(p,(w0, e w1)) = 1.
Proof. Since w0 > e w0, v1 (p1,m 1 (p,(w0, e w1))) = v2 (p2,m 2 (p,(w0, e w1))).C o n s i d e r a p e r -
turbation dw0,1 to w0,1. Notice that by construction of V (p1), dm1 > 0= ⇒ dm2 < 0= ⇒
(dv1 > 0 and dv2 < 0),w h e r e a sdm2 > 0= ⇒ dm1 < 0= ⇒ (dv1 < 0 and dv2 > 0), which cannot
be optimal, given that vs is increasing in m.
Now, suppose that for every p,t h e r ee x i s t se w such that v1 (p1,m 1 (p, e w)) = v2 (p2,m 2 (p, e w)),
and consider only w with w0 > e w0 and w1 = e w1.

























Now, the rank of system f (p0,m) is, by deﬁnition, the rank of:
⎡






⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
If Bl and Cl are zero then the system is of rank 1, the utility function is homothetic and clearly
the regularity condition does not hold. If B2 (p0)C3 (p0) − B2 (p0)C3 (p0) 6=0the system has rank
at least 2. Below, we prove that, for this case, the regularity condition holds.






















































It follows that the regularity condition is satisﬁed if









































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
6=0
⇔































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
6=0
⇔













¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
6=0
⇔ C2(p0)B3(p0) − C3(p0)B2(p0) 6=0
Ar a n k3 system clearly satisﬁes this condition and, if the condition is satisﬁed, then the rank is
at least 2.9
7 Appendix 2: Duality in Incomplete Markets
Fix an individual i, but ignore its superindex.
Deﬁne U =
©








For each (w1,µ) ∈ RLS










: u(x)=µ and p1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (p1)i
ª
.
9For the special case considered in previous footnote, the regularity condition is equivalent to:
(c1b2 − c2b1)P1 6=0
which is true for all (P1,P 2) as long as the demand system has rank 3 or rank 2, with c1b2 − c2b1 6=0 .
28Proposition 1 For each (w1,µ) ∈ RLS
++ × U, D(w1,µ) is diﬀeomorphic to
©











Proof. Let D denote the latter set. That D(w1,µ) and D are diﬀeomorphic is straightforward.
We now show that D is open. Let p ∈ D.B y d e ﬁnition, for some x ∈ RN
++, u(x)=µ and
p1 ¡(x1 − w1) ∈ hV (p1)i, whereas using the implicit function theorem, since ∂x0 (u(x)) ∈ RL
++,f o r
some ε>0, Bε (x1) ⊆ RLS
++ and
(∀e x1 ∈ Bε (x1))
¡
∃e x0 ∈ RL
++
¢
: u(e x0,e x1)=u(x).
Given that ∀(s,l) ∈ {1,...,S}×{1,...,L}, limδ−→0
δ(ws,l−xs,l)
ps,l
ps,1 +δ =0 ,t h e r ee x i s t sδs,l > 0 such that
|δ| < δs,l =⇒

























. The function h is continuous, therefore there is a δ>0 such that for








¯ ¯ ¯ < δ.
Deﬁne x0














































¯ ¯ ¯ <
δ 6 δs,l, from where
¯ ¯ ¯x0
s,l − xs,l
¯ ¯ ¯ < ε √
LS and, hence, kx0
1 − x1k <ε .T h i si m p l i e st h a tx0
1 ∈ Bε (x1)
and, therefore, that there exists x0
0 ∈ RL
++ such that u(x0
0,x 0
1)=u(x).













pS,1)¡(x1 − w1) ∈ hV i, and, hence,
p0 ∈ D.
For each (w1,µ) ∈ RLS
++ × U such that D(w1,µ) 6= ∅,d e ﬁne the Hicksian demand function
h(·;w1,µ):D(w1,µ) −→ RN
++,a s





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
u(x) ≥ µ and p1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (p1)i
)
,
29and the expenditure function e(·;w1,µ):D(w1,µ) −→ R,a se(p;w1,µ)=p · h(p;w1,µ).
By condition 2, h(p;w1,µ) is well deﬁned into RN
++.
Now, for each w1 ∈ RLS
++,d e ﬁne D(w1) ⊆ S
N−1

















s=0 ps · xs 6 m








Proposition 2 For each w1 ∈ RLS
















s=0 ps · xs 6 m








which is nonempty and open.
Proof. This is straightforward.
For each w1 ∈ RLS
++,d e ﬁne the conditional individual demand function e f (·,·;w1):D(w1) −→
RN
++ as





ps · xs ≤ m and p1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (p1)i
)
.
By condition 2, any solution to the maximization problem above lies in RN





Proposition 3 1. For every w =( w0,w 1) ∈ RN
++ and every p ∈ S
N−1
++ , u(f(p,w)) ∈ U, p ∈
D(w1,u(f(p,w))) and h(p;w1,u(f(p,w))) = f(p,w);
2. Given (w1,µ) ∈ RLS
++ × U, for every p ∈ D(w1,µ), f (p,h(p;w1,µ)) = h(p;w1,µ);
3. Given (w1,µ) ∈ RLS
++×U, for every p ∈ D(w1,µ), (p,e(p,w,µ)) ∈ D(w1) and e f (p,e(p,w,µ);w1)=
h(p;w1,µ).
Proof. Part (1) is straightforward: argue by contradiction and use strict monotonicity of the
utility function.
Given that u is continuous, for parts (2) and (3) it suﬃces to prove that u(h(p;w1,µ)) = µ.
For this, suppose not: u(h(p;w1,µ)) >µ .D e ﬁne x = h(p;w1,µ) − (ε,0,...,0),w h e r eε ∈ R++.B y
construction, x1 = h1(p;w1,µ), from where p1¡(x1 − w1) ∈ hV (p1)i,a n d
PS
s=0 ps·xs <e (p;w1,µ),
30whereas since h(p;w1,µ) ∈ RN
++,f o rε small enough x ∈ RN
+ and, by continuity, u(x) > µ,w h i c hi s
a contradiction.
Proposition 4 (Shepard’s Lemma) For every (w1,µ) ∈ RLS
++ × U,t h ef u n c t i o ne(·;w1,µ):
D(w1,µ) −→ R++ is diﬀerentiable and ∂pe(p;w1,µ)=h(p;w1,µ).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the Duality Theorem (see Mas-Colell et al. [16,




¯ ¯ui(x) ≥ µ and p1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (p1)i
ª
; then, K is closed
and e(p;w1,µ) is the support function of K.
Proposition 5 For every w1 ∈ RLS
++, the function e f (·,·;w1):D(w1) −→ RN
++ is diﬀerentiable.
Proof. T h i sc a nb ea r g u e di nt h es a m ew a ya sf a c t5i nD u ﬃe and Shafer [9].
Proposition 6 (Slutsky Equation in incomplete markets) Let (p,w) ∈ S
N−1
++ × RN
+ and µ =
u(f(p,w)).T h e n , h(·;w1,µ):D(w1,µ) −→ RN










(fs0,l0 (p,w) − ws0,l0).
Proof. That h(·;w1,µ) is diﬀerentiable follows from propositions 3 and 5.




∂ e fs,l (p,e(p;w1,µ);w1)
∂ps0,l0
+









∂ e fs,l (p,e(p;w1,µ);w1)
∂ps0,l0
+
∂ e fs,l (p,e(p;w1,µ);w1)
∂m
hs0,l0(p;w1,µ).




s=0 ps · ws;w1
´































∂ e fs,l (p,e(p,w,µ);w1)
∂ps0,l0
+




∂   fs,l(p,e(p,w,µ);w1)







∂ e fs,l (p,e(p,w,µ);w1)
∂m
(hs0,l0(p;w1,µ) − ws0,l0).





























∂m , so substitution gives the desired result.
8 Appendix 3: Complements prove of Theorem (***)











and where Φ satisﬁes all the properties that characterize identiﬁcation in the no-arbitrage equilibrium
manifold then Φ satisﬁes all properties that characterize aggregate demand in the ﬁnancial markets
equilibrium manifold.






















































= V (p1)z = Vz









































which isthe last thing we had to prove.
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